raver_mania
10-01-2003, 02:09 PM
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=344377&contrassID=2&subContrassID=14&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y
Don't make me laugh
By Amira Hass
Palestinians find it hard to address seriously the statements by some settlers that they would prefer to remain as citizens of the new state rather than be evacuated. But if this should happen, they stress, the settlements would also be open to Palestinians
The immediate reaction of all those questioned was
a great laugh and astonishment. The astonishment
was over an unexpected question that seemed to
come from some imaginary scenario totally detached
from reality. That question was: "Under what
conditions could Israeli settlers continue to live
within the borders of the future Palestinian
state?"
This question is perhaps
relevant to the internal
Israeli debate, but it seems
forced and artificial to
Palestinian ears for two
reasons. First, the
Palestinians are witness to a
continuous and accelerated
process of settlement
expansion, with so-called
"isolated" settlements (like Psagot) linked
together into territorially contiguous Israeli
blocs that encircle Palestinian districts,
cutting them off from one other.
The Palestinians view this expansion as a
well-planned, concerted effort aimed at
ensuring Israeli sovereignty over as much
territory as possible in the West Bank and
minimizing the number of settlements that will
be included within the borders of the
Palestinian state or dismantled. The tiny and
isolated settlements (like Ganim and Kadim),
which are located deep in Palestinian territory
and are slated for evacuation, are not as
worrisome as the large settlements that range
over several hilltops (like Eli, Givat Ze'ev,
Efrata and Itamar). A hypothetical question
concerning the future of a minuscule percentage
of the settlers does not elicit a great desire
to respond.
The second reason is that people do not even
know what will happen the following day: Will
there be a curfew? Will the roadblock that was
sort of opened for a few days be closed again?
Will there be a new incursion? Will there be a
suicide attack that brings a new, tough closure
and new land confiscation orders? Will the
children make it to school? This creates
personal, social and national uncertainty that
naturally has an impact on the desire and
ability to confidently sketch out future
scenarios.
Thus, when someone is ready to take a chance and
imagine a future scenario like this, the answer
breaks down into several questions and
responses, with conditions attached. All of
these ultimately boil down to one question:
Will this Palestinian state be established as
part of what the Palestinians could accept as a
fair and just accord? Or will it be part of a
surrender treaty Israel is able to impose
because of its military and political
superiority?
Judging from countless conversations, in
circumstances in which the interlocutors did
not feel obliged to recite or lie or put on a
show, the great majority of Palestinians regard
a fair agreement as one based on establishing a
Palestinian state along the 1967 borders,
including East Jerusalem, and including the
evacuation of settlements.
In principle, the demand is for the evacuation
of all of the settlements, while the
implementation could include compromises such
as territorial exchanges on a one-to-one basis,
as long as the territory being swapped is of
the same quality in terms of distance, land and
water resources.
And what about the right of return for refugees?
What is said for public consumption in slogans
is not the same as what is expressed in private
conversations. The loud noise made by those
demanding the right of return does not
necessarily indicate that they represent a
small minority. But neither does it mean that
they comprise a majority. Either way, in the
framework of an agreement the Palestinians
regard as fair, the debate over the right of
return and its implementation will take on
different dimensions: more emphasis on the
principle, on the need for Israel to recognize
the tragedy its establishment brought upon the
Palestinians, and less on the implementation.
As the head of a local council in the southern
West Bank put it: The moment they agree to
right 80 percent of the wrong, I'm prepared to
give up 20 percent of my rights.
If this is the overall scenario, then Israeli
settlers would be invited to live freely within
the Palestinian state. Here the respondents
paint a rosy picture of the past: "Didn't we
live in harmony prior to 1948?" There are also
those who prettify the present situation within
Israel: Don't Jews and Arabs live side by side
as good neighbors in Lod?" asked Umm Ibrahim, a
resident of the Askar camp in Nablus, a refugee
from a village in the Lod area.
An imposed arrangement, on the other hand, does
not allow people to imagine relations of "good
neighbors." In this type of agreement, for
example, the large settlements like Ma'aleh
Adumim, Givat Ze'ev and Pisgat Ze'ev (which is
not a "Jerusalem neighborhood" for the
Palestinians, but a settlement), would deny
Palestinian Jerusalem its expanse, turning East
Jerusalem into a handful of weak villages and
prevent Palestinian territorial contiguity
between Bethlehem and Ramallah.
In this imposed solution scenario, who would
guarantee that the few settlers who prefer not
to leave their homes and to remain instead
within the boundaries of the Palestinian state
would not demand Israeli military protection,
for example? In this scenario, the settlers
would rightly claim that their lives are
threatened by their frustrated neighbors. What
Palestinian would then agree to the presence of
foreign soldiers in the sovereign territory of
his state?
Ultimately, Umm Ibrahim feels clearly
uncomfortable with the question about the
conditions for allowing the settlers to remain.
"With all of the hatred, how could this be
imagined? Their entire goal is to take our
land. Evacuating all of the settlements? Not in
my lifetime."
S., a woman of 65 from the village of Sinjel, is
also skeptical about the possibility of ever
seeing settlements dismantled. Her family's
land is stuck between Eli and the illegal
outpost Givat Haroeh. For years, the villagers
have been unable to access their lands adjacent
to the Shiloh settlement and its extensions,
which were once unauthorized outposts and are
now flourishing neighborhoods. She mumbles, as
if to herself, "Never" when asked about
dismantling settlements. This is not the answer
political activists allow themselves to express
openly. But the widespread conclusion among
Palestinians is that the representatives of the
Palestinian Authority already conceded at Camp
David and Taba: They agreed that the large
settlements would be included in the State of
Israel.
Salah Ta'amri, a veteran Fatah leader and
member of the Palestinian Legislative Council,
has been involved since his return to the
country in 1995 in political efforts to stop
Israeli construction in the settlements. He
tried and failed. Tamri had just left a meeting
in Nahalin, a village southwest of Bethlehem,
when he was asked this question about the
future of settlers in a Palestinian state. One
could call his visit to Nahalin a condolence
call over the continued loss of fertile and
cultivated land - this time for the sake of the
security fence being constructed around the
Betar settlement.
"To stay and live among us?" he responded in a
burst of laughter. "This would be a miracle.
First of all, they don't like us and don't like
our culture. They hate us. For them, we're just
objects. But if their attitude changes, then
welcome - they're invited to live in our state,
with equal rights. It's a free economy. People
can purchase apartments, live where they want
and where it's comfortable for them."
Tamri did not give a direct reply to the
question of whether he thinks it is possible
that settlements that are part of the Israeli
consensus (Givat Ze'ev, Ma'aleh Adumim, Efrata)
will be evacuated. "Injustice does not cease to
be injustice, only because it is big," he
said.
Khalil Tufkaji is a geographer who worked for
years at the Institution of Geographical
Studies under the auspices of the Orient House,
led by the late Faisal Husseini. Tufkaji
collected every bit of information on land
expropriation and settlement construction. Back
in the early 1990s, he already prepared three
scenarios for settlers remaining in a sovereign
Palestinian entity: as residents (like
Americans living in Japan), honoring
Palestinian law; or as equal citizens in a
Palestinian state; or Israel will pay the
Palestinian state for a 20-year lease on the
settlements. After these two decades pass, the
settlements would pass into Palestinian hands.
In return for an appropriate sum, he is
convinced, most of the settlers who moved into
settlements for economic reasons will also
agree "to return home, to Israel."
As Husseini once said, Tufkaji adds, the
Israelis who wish to do so will be able to
remain in their homes and settlements, within
the Palestinian state. But the settlements will
not remain "deluxe ghettos" for Jews only. The
settlements and their infrastructure, which
Israel invested huge sums to develop while
neglecting Palestinian cities and villages,
would be opened to anyone wishing to reside
there. "We are speaking about a future of
partnership, where Palestinians and Jews live
in the same building," Tufkaji said. He laughed
when asked again and again if he believes this
will happen, and when.
n
Don't make me laugh
By Amira Hass
Palestinians find it hard to address seriously the statements by some settlers that they would prefer to remain as citizens of the new state rather than be evacuated. But if this should happen, they stress, the settlements would also be open to Palestinians
The immediate reaction of all those questioned was
a great laugh and astonishment. The astonishment
was over an unexpected question that seemed to
come from some imaginary scenario totally detached
from reality. That question was: "Under what
conditions could Israeli settlers continue to live
within the borders of the future Palestinian
state?"
This question is perhaps
relevant to the internal
Israeli debate, but it seems
forced and artificial to
Palestinian ears for two
reasons. First, the
Palestinians are witness to a
continuous and accelerated
process of settlement
expansion, with so-called
"isolated" settlements (like Psagot) linked
together into territorially contiguous Israeli
blocs that encircle Palestinian districts,
cutting them off from one other.
The Palestinians view this expansion as a
well-planned, concerted effort aimed at
ensuring Israeli sovereignty over as much
territory as possible in the West Bank and
minimizing the number of settlements that will
be included within the borders of the
Palestinian state or dismantled. The tiny and
isolated settlements (like Ganim and Kadim),
which are located deep in Palestinian territory
and are slated for evacuation, are not as
worrisome as the large settlements that range
over several hilltops (like Eli, Givat Ze'ev,
Efrata and Itamar). A hypothetical question
concerning the future of a minuscule percentage
of the settlers does not elicit a great desire
to respond.
The second reason is that people do not even
know what will happen the following day: Will
there be a curfew? Will the roadblock that was
sort of opened for a few days be closed again?
Will there be a new incursion? Will there be a
suicide attack that brings a new, tough closure
and new land confiscation orders? Will the
children make it to school? This creates
personal, social and national uncertainty that
naturally has an impact on the desire and
ability to confidently sketch out future
scenarios.
Thus, when someone is ready to take a chance and
imagine a future scenario like this, the answer
breaks down into several questions and
responses, with conditions attached. All of
these ultimately boil down to one question:
Will this Palestinian state be established as
part of what the Palestinians could accept as a
fair and just accord? Or will it be part of a
surrender treaty Israel is able to impose
because of its military and political
superiority?
Judging from countless conversations, in
circumstances in which the interlocutors did
not feel obliged to recite or lie or put on a
show, the great majority of Palestinians regard
a fair agreement as one based on establishing a
Palestinian state along the 1967 borders,
including East Jerusalem, and including the
evacuation of settlements.
In principle, the demand is for the evacuation
of all of the settlements, while the
implementation could include compromises such
as territorial exchanges on a one-to-one basis,
as long as the territory being swapped is of
the same quality in terms of distance, land and
water resources.
And what about the right of return for refugees?
What is said for public consumption in slogans
is not the same as what is expressed in private
conversations. The loud noise made by those
demanding the right of return does not
necessarily indicate that they represent a
small minority. But neither does it mean that
they comprise a majority. Either way, in the
framework of an agreement the Palestinians
regard as fair, the debate over the right of
return and its implementation will take on
different dimensions: more emphasis on the
principle, on the need for Israel to recognize
the tragedy its establishment brought upon the
Palestinians, and less on the implementation.
As the head of a local council in the southern
West Bank put it: The moment they agree to
right 80 percent of the wrong, I'm prepared to
give up 20 percent of my rights.
If this is the overall scenario, then Israeli
settlers would be invited to live freely within
the Palestinian state. Here the respondents
paint a rosy picture of the past: "Didn't we
live in harmony prior to 1948?" There are also
those who prettify the present situation within
Israel: Don't Jews and Arabs live side by side
as good neighbors in Lod?" asked Umm Ibrahim, a
resident of the Askar camp in Nablus, a refugee
from a village in the Lod area.
An imposed arrangement, on the other hand, does
not allow people to imagine relations of "good
neighbors." In this type of agreement, for
example, the large settlements like Ma'aleh
Adumim, Givat Ze'ev and Pisgat Ze'ev (which is
not a "Jerusalem neighborhood" for the
Palestinians, but a settlement), would deny
Palestinian Jerusalem its expanse, turning East
Jerusalem into a handful of weak villages and
prevent Palestinian territorial contiguity
between Bethlehem and Ramallah.
In this imposed solution scenario, who would
guarantee that the few settlers who prefer not
to leave their homes and to remain instead
within the boundaries of the Palestinian state
would not demand Israeli military protection,
for example? In this scenario, the settlers
would rightly claim that their lives are
threatened by their frustrated neighbors. What
Palestinian would then agree to the presence of
foreign soldiers in the sovereign territory of
his state?
Ultimately, Umm Ibrahim feels clearly
uncomfortable with the question about the
conditions for allowing the settlers to remain.
"With all of the hatred, how could this be
imagined? Their entire goal is to take our
land. Evacuating all of the settlements? Not in
my lifetime."
S., a woman of 65 from the village of Sinjel, is
also skeptical about the possibility of ever
seeing settlements dismantled. Her family's
land is stuck between Eli and the illegal
outpost Givat Haroeh. For years, the villagers
have been unable to access their lands adjacent
to the Shiloh settlement and its extensions,
which were once unauthorized outposts and are
now flourishing neighborhoods. She mumbles, as
if to herself, "Never" when asked about
dismantling settlements. This is not the answer
political activists allow themselves to express
openly. But the widespread conclusion among
Palestinians is that the representatives of the
Palestinian Authority already conceded at Camp
David and Taba: They agreed that the large
settlements would be included in the State of
Israel.
Salah Ta'amri, a veteran Fatah leader and
member of the Palestinian Legislative Council,
has been involved since his return to the
country in 1995 in political efforts to stop
Israeli construction in the settlements. He
tried and failed. Tamri had just left a meeting
in Nahalin, a village southwest of Bethlehem,
when he was asked this question about the
future of settlers in a Palestinian state. One
could call his visit to Nahalin a condolence
call over the continued loss of fertile and
cultivated land - this time for the sake of the
security fence being constructed around the
Betar settlement.
"To stay and live among us?" he responded in a
burst of laughter. "This would be a miracle.
First of all, they don't like us and don't like
our culture. They hate us. For them, we're just
objects. But if their attitude changes, then
welcome - they're invited to live in our state,
with equal rights. It's a free economy. People
can purchase apartments, live where they want
and where it's comfortable for them."
Tamri did not give a direct reply to the
question of whether he thinks it is possible
that settlements that are part of the Israeli
consensus (Givat Ze'ev, Ma'aleh Adumim, Efrata)
will be evacuated. "Injustice does not cease to
be injustice, only because it is big," he
said.
Khalil Tufkaji is a geographer who worked for
years at the Institution of Geographical
Studies under the auspices of the Orient House,
led by the late Faisal Husseini. Tufkaji
collected every bit of information on land
expropriation and settlement construction. Back
in the early 1990s, he already prepared three
scenarios for settlers remaining in a sovereign
Palestinian entity: as residents (like
Americans living in Japan), honoring
Palestinian law; or as equal citizens in a
Palestinian state; or Israel will pay the
Palestinian state for a 20-year lease on the
settlements. After these two decades pass, the
settlements would pass into Palestinian hands.
In return for an appropriate sum, he is
convinced, most of the settlers who moved into
settlements for economic reasons will also
agree "to return home, to Israel."
As Husseini once said, Tufkaji adds, the
Israelis who wish to do so will be able to
remain in their homes and settlements, within
the Palestinian state. But the settlements will
not remain "deluxe ghettos" for Jews only. The
settlements and their infrastructure, which
Israel invested huge sums to develop while
neglecting Palestinian cities and villages,
would be opened to anyone wishing to reside
there. "We are speaking about a future of
partnership, where Palestinians and Jews live
in the same building," Tufkaji said. He laughed
when asked again and again if he believes this
will happen, and when.
n